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The Foucauldian Peacekeeper: 
On the Dispersion of Power and the Futility of Change 
Ansgar Allen 
 
Foucault is widely known for the radical nature of his work, for his idiosyncratic approach to 
history, and for his reconfiguration of the concept of power.  Curiously though, his conceptions of 
history and power might act to undermine their potential to incite radical critique of systems of 
education and wider society; resulting in a more patient, restrained and ultimately conservative 
scholarship than you would at first expect.  The apparent points of similarity between Michel 
Foucault, Herbert George Wells and the reformist, statistician and eugenicist, Karl Pearson, will be 
outlined in order to exemplify this apparent danger. Whilst Foucault would be at odds with 
Pearson’s authoritarian view of education, the Foucauldian account of power seems, oddly, to lead 
to agreement with Pearson on the futility of revolutionary change. 
 
Introduction 
Genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species (Michel Foucault 1971: 374) [1]. 
Following on from Nietzsche, Michel Foucault developed an approach to history that was far 
from ordinary.  Indeed the name it chooses is immediately misleading - it is called ‘genealogy’.  
We are not concerned here with clearing ivy from forgotten tombs.  Rather, as a mode of 
historical research genealogy is intended as a challenge to conventional wisdom.  It is a type of 
analysis that provokes us to reconsider our view of the world.  It aims to show us the profound 
historical contingency of all that we hold to be true and proper.  And sometimes it allows us to 
perceive danger in what was formerly a noble lineage of descent.  Ultimately, this is an approach 
to our past that seeks to reorient our view of the present.  Genealogy is part of a radical project 
that undermines the inevitability of things, and allows us to redirect ourselves towards the 
possibility of radical change. 
In this paper I shall argue that such ambition is in danger of decay from within, that it promotes 
within itself a gradual withdrawal from the struggle it once perceived.  My claim is that in certain 
important respects, the genealogical project resembles evolutionary thought, and is at risk of 
adopting the gradual reformism such thought can inspire.   
My intention is not to reveal timeless flaws in the genealogical project; merely it is to hint at some 
potential consequences.  Foucault’s radical desire is not in question here, nor is the coherence of 
his work.  As a thinker he was always in motion and so it makes little sense to critique a grand 
plan that was never properly formulated.  My point of entry is rather at the level of 
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interpretation.  I wish to explore the potential effects of a genealogical worldview insofar as it 
influences our work.  Genealogy is based upon the dispersion of power, and this fact of 
dispersion might act to switch analysis from feisty departures towards more conservative 
conclusions.  This would be deeply ironic given the nature of Foucault’s work.  In the text that 
follows, such irony will be deployed as a tactic, in an attempt to recover what is radical within.  
In order to make this case I shall first deliver a brief account of genealogy as developed by 
Foucault, alongside a short treatment of those notions of power and conflict upon which 
genealogy rests.  Similarities will be identified between genealogy, and a pre-modern form of 
historical work that Foucault labels ‘counterhistory’.  If these similarities are compelling then the 
dangers that beset counterhistory must be considered as potential threats to genealogy.  I shall 
argue that like counterhistory, genealogy faces reduction to evolutionary thinking.  The practical 
consequence of this is that we are tempted to adopt a reformist attitude - a position that 
advocates calm acceptance in the face of existing dispositions of power.  Overall, this argument 
will be presented in terms of the apparent connections between Foucauldian genealogy, the 
changing perspectives of Herbert George Wells, and the early work of the eugenicist and 
statistician Karl Pearson[2]. 
Genealogy and Power 
Knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting (Foucault 1971: 380). 
Foucault provides some early hints of his line of attack in an essay on Nietzsche, genealogy and 
history:  Traditional modes of historical inquiry, we are told, hope to achieve objectivity by 
reducing the ‘diversity of time into a totality fully closed upon itself’.  Genealogy on the other 
hand, refuses the possibility of neutral overview and works towards the decomposition of any 
such historical unity.  It ‘reintroduces into the realm of becoming everything considered immortal 
in man’ (Foucault 1971: 379).  Nothing of sufficient stability has endured throughout time upon 
which we might build the foundations of historical understanding.  There is nothing universal or 
transcendental to which we can appeal.  Understanding is in flux for we exist without constants, 
or so the genealogist claims.  And so we are tasked with unfurling complexity and demonstrating 
the fluidity of our being...  Of course, the genealogical account must also be heavily perspectival 
and genealogy happily ‘acknowledges its system of injustice’.  But this acknowledgement does not 
act as a restraint for ‘it is not given to discrete effacement before the objects it observes’ 
(Foucault 1971: 382).  Genealogy is a bold and militant activity. 
According to this view, the course of history moves forward in a tumble, regulated by no other 
system than the ‘luck of the battle’ (Foucault 1971: 381).  History is an ‘endlessly repeated play of 
dominations’, where the events of history are the product of points of intersection between 
multiple, contending forces (Foucault 1971: 377).  Events are produced on the frontier so to 
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speak.  So the genealogist is faced with a task that is grey and meticulous (as well as bold and 
militant) for these entangled forces are what must be prised apart through careful analysis.   
This account of history is based upon a certain conception of power as an entity that is more 
radically dispersed than conventional thought admits.  ‘Power is everywhere; not because it 
embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere’ (Foucault 1976b: 93); it is a 
relational activity of exertion and manoeuvre, a constant flux of human realignment and 
pragmatic calculation.  But despite this dispersion of power throughout the social body, our 
freedom to act and react is nevertheless constrained by channels of power that have gradually 
coalesced to become overarching strategies that direct and constrain our world of possibilities.  
We live within an endlessly superseding play of dominations that vie for the control of our 
thoughts, our truths and our actions. 
Counterhistory, biopower and eugenics 
A key resource for this interpretation of power and history is Foucault’s eleven part lecture series 
of 1976.  These lectures tell a history of history, beginning with its ritual use in ceremonies 
intended to demonstrate a sovereign’s right to rule.  This ritual use was challenged when at 
various points back in time a form of counterhistory emerged.  Histories of sovereigns were 
gradually replaced by multiple, perspectival histories of races.  There was no longer one history 
for all; rather history became an oppositional tool by which the status quo could be challenged…  
As Foucault traces this history of counterhistorical work - that is, the history of history before it 
became a respectable academic discipline - one is tempted to insert ‘proto-genealogy’ wherever 
‘counterhistory’ finds mention.  For alongside this history of history runs an ongoing attempt to 
reconceptualise power.  Indeed, Foucault seems to celebrate this perspectival, embattled use of 
history, as he leans towards an interpretation of power that is based upon a metaphor of warlike 
relations.  Foucault appears to situate himself in this world of perpetual conflict, where historical 
work is something ‘in which truth functions as a weapon to be used for partisan victory’ 
(Foucault 1976a: 270).  Thus in his exploration of ‘counterhistory’ we find the general conditions 
of all historical work.  Whether consciously or not, the historian is involved in this interplay of 
force relations; historical truth is a mere deployment from a combat position.   
But this does not open the door to utter fiction, for even though the historian becomes partisan, 
historical truths are still deployed from a combat position, rather than from empty space.  This 
position is one at which historical discourses intersect, forming a closely woven web of common 
resource and understanding.  It is only because historical knowledge is to some extent regularised 
that it becomes possible to disagree along strict lines of confrontation[3].  And so scholarship 
must be as diligent, perhaps more so than normal, for the (counter)historian requires great 
erudition to enter the field, master it, and then tactically subvert it in all its detail.   
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Whilst Foucault comes out in praise of counterhistorical work, in the final lecture he also 
interrogates its dangers by associating it with a deviant offshoot, one that degenerated into racist 
discourse.  Counterhistorical work degenerated when it became coupled to evolutionary thought, 
as historical conflict was replaced by biological struggle.  Warring binaries gave way to monisms, 
as threats were reduced to internal dangers to the overall welfare of society.   
This was associated with the rise of biopower, a strategy of control that promotes population 
health as its ambiguous aim.  Concerned with population-level phenomena, biopower seeks to 
regulate the internal dynamics of a population that it takes as its special object of study.  It 
observes and calculates, finding trends and cycles in characteristics that are to be found only at 
the macroscopic level.  Concerned with the maintenance of overall life; death, confinement, 
compulsion or any form of imposed hardship may be justified now in terms of overall wellbeing.  
Those infamous strategies of social hygiene promoted within eugenic thought, provide a case 
study in this sort of biopower, and exemplify the danger of transforming conflict into a state 
discourse of self-defence.  Confinement, sterilisation and execution were all justified in terms of 
population health in a scheme that takes life as its organising principle.  It is important to add 
however, that although eugenics is used to exemplify the principles of biopower in this paper, I 
do not wish to suggest that eugenics is anything more than a case study in biopower.  Biopower 
itself is not essentially ‘bad’, it is merely ambiguous and this is where its danger lies. 
To conclude, if counterhistory is viewed as a sort of proto-genealogy, then the dangers Foucault 
identifies for counterhistory become potential defects for genealogy.  According to Foucault, 
counterhistory degenerated into racist discourse when it encountered evolutionary thinking.  
Although this coupling resulted in great brutality, it also allowed for the taming of 
counterhistorical work as it became absorbed within ‘technical’ issues of population regulation…  
Now the merits of this argument are, of course, open for debate.  I only wish to suggest that we 
apply Foucault’s analysis of counterhistory to our analysis of genealogy.  As I shall argue, a 
similar danger might face the radical intent within genealogical work:  Genealogy is at risk of 
inspiring reformist tendencies due to its structural affinities to the sort of evolutionary thinking 
that once captured counterhistory and turned it into an internal, technical concern of state 
governance. 
A Wellsian Transition 
Any tradition that embraces conflict comes with its associated dangers, as do traditions that hide 
strategies of power behind claims of neutrality.  By aligning himself with the former tradition 
Foucault was candid enough to explore its dangers:  Whatever Foucauldian ‘genealogy’ may be, it 
must resist any cooption of struggle by dominant forces such as biopower, which reduced 
conflict to a logic of state control.  By situating itself within a world of conflicting forces, 
genealogy seeks to undermine domination by participating in perpetual agitation.  Committed to 
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the repeated unveiling of power, it constantly creates and discards truth-weapon-deployments in 
an ‘undefined work of freedom’ (Foucault 2000: 316).    
Now my reduction of power to metaphors of war/combat/bellicosity and so on might be viewed 
as excessive.  After all, this emphasis only finds prominence in one series of lectures and a slim 
volume published shortly after; that is, within Society Must Be Defenced and The Will to Knowledge 
(Foucault 1976a, 1976b).  In addition, three months after his last lecture Foucault was expressing 
doubts remarking; ‘it is astonishing to see how easily and self-evidently people talk of warlike 
relations of power’ (Foucault 1977: 124).  By 1980 his stance had altered significantly: 
Discussions on political subjects are parasitized by the model of war: a person who has 
different ideas is identified as a class enemy who must be fought until a final victory is won.  
This great theme of ideological struggle makes me smile a little, given that each individual’s 
theoretical ties, when they are examined in their history, are tangled and fluctuating and 
don’t have the clear definition of a border beyond which an enemy could be forced to flee.  
Isn’t this struggle one tries to conduct against an enemy basically a way of giving a degree 
of seriousness to little disputes that don’t have much importance?  Don’t intellectuals hope 
to give themselves, through ideological struggle, a greater political weight than they really 
have?  Wouldn’t it be more serious, instead, to do research side by side, if in rather 
divergent directions?  If one always insists on saying that one is fighting an enemy, if a day 
comes when one finds oneself in a situation of actual warfare, which can always happen, 
will one then be tempted to actually treat him as such?  That route leads directly to 
oppression; it is dangerous.  I understand that an intellectual can manifest a desire to be 
taken seriously by a party or in a society by simulating warfare against an ideological 
opponent – but that looks dangerous to me.  It would be wiser to consider those with 
whom one disagrees have made a mistake, or that one hasn’t understood what they were 
trying to do (Foucault 1980: 297). 
It would seem that Foucault is engaging reverse gear here and is withdrawing from his earlier 
more combative emphasis.  But we are still faced with a decision as to which Foucault we choose 
to emphasise in our work.  In this text he seems almost weary of combative statements, perhaps 
even a little weary of his former self.  We however are not in 1970s Paris, and the same sense of 
fatigue might be disturbingly absent from our minds.  In a context that sometimes appears 
strangely pacified and muted, the earlier Foucault might be more appropriate. 
Somewhat later he suggested:  ‘Rather than speaking of an essential antagonism, it would be 
better to speak of an “agonism” - of a relationship that is at the same time mutual incitement and 
struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation that paralyses both sides than a permanent 
provocation’ (Foucault 1982: 342).  Whether Foucault has entirely abandoned the war metaphor 
by this point, or whether he has merely refined it, is an open question.  It is certainly possible that 
we risk exaggeration by locating our understanding of Foucauldian power within a narrative of 
combat.  Perhaps though, we might view this more favourably as an exercise in reassessing 
power, or as a tactical manoeuvre aimed at rendering our use of Foucault more directly political. 
However appropriate this bellicose view of the world may be, my claim is simply this; whether 
power is viewed to be warlike or not, an element of conflict remains within its Foucauldian 
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definition.  Genealogy - an approach to history that turns on the analysis of power - must situate 
itself within the world it perceives, and genealogy tends to perceive the world in terms of 
interacting force relations.  But it would seem to face difficulties in this respect:  There is a 
possible sticking point within it that has the potential to generate mismatch between perceived 
world and chosen action.    By its own standards genealogy is faced by a menace from within; its 
own conceptions of history and power threaten to reduce tireless activity to a state of near 
paralysis.  I propose to demonstrate this potential for self-emasculation by charting the changing 
perspectives of Herbert George Wells, from a eugenicist, and hence proponent of biopower - 
that degenerate heir of counterhistory - to a position not altogether divorced from the 
genealogical resolve described above.   
My story begins with a time-traveller, trapped eight hundred thousand years in the future:  The 
human race has become two separate species; the carnivorous Morlock and the defenceless Eloi 
upon whom the Morlock feast.  A degeneration of the elite into mere beautiful frailty and of the 
poor into parasitic savagery, this chilling extension of the evolutionary metaphor, provided by 
Wells in The Time Machine of 1895, was a plausible scenario for its time.   
At the turn of the century Anticipations was a Wellsian attempt at predicting the more immediate 
future:  He speculates that a ‘World State of capable rational men’ will come to pass, in which 
they have been freed from tradition and notions of transcendent morality (Wells 1901).  Under 
this new rational order they will determine a fresh ethical scheme that is based upon nothing but 
evolutionary reality.  Acting in ‘harmony with the universal will’ of nature (Wells 1901: 253), 
recognising ‘that the scheme of being in which we live is a struggle of existences’ (Wells 1901: 
254), these capable rational men will ‘check the procreation of base and servile types’ and ‘all that 
is mean and ugly and bestial in the souls, bodies, or habits of men’, by the method ‘that nature 
has followed hitherto’, that of death (Wells 1901: 256-7).   
In this bleak eugenic futurology, we find a good example of biopower and its ambiguous 
morality, in which a form of power that is oriented towards life, can justify death in the name of 
the self-defence and health of the whole. 
Two years later in 1903 Wells published Mankind in the Making in which he began to doubt the 
practicality of eugenics. His work was now intended as a ‘direct challenge’ to a eugenic 
movement that was threatening ‘much rash interference’ (Wells 1914a: ix-x).  Wells was still in 
search of an organising principle for political and social affairs and still looked towards life as a 
core idea, rather than more conventional notions such as right, liberty, happiness or duty.  But 
the problem with eugenics, he claimed, is that we do not really know what points to breed for 
and what points to breed out, for we do not seek homogeneity of the human form, rather we 
require a wide mixture of personalities.  Indeed, removing the criminal from the breeding chain 
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might also remove ‘the possession of a bold and enterprising character, of a degree of pride and 
energy above the needs of the position his social surroundings have forced upon him’ (Wells 
1914a: 54-5).  Reading between the lines; this ‘criminal’ motivation to resist one’s immediate 
social surroundings, to boldly perforate our social enclosure, might be of use.   
After another two years came the publication of a Utopian tract, different in quality we are told, 
from all the predecessors in its genre.  The ideal world depicted here is a post-Darwinian place 
for it does not represent a static end-state.  Instead a modern, post-Darwinian utopia must adopt 
the programme of a dynamic and evolving world.  A Modern Utopia is a place where the dissident 
tendencies of the Criminal Mind are put to more constructive use, for this society is to be built 
upon the presumption that ‘we accept this world of conflict’ (Wells 1905: 13) thereby allowing 
the law of struggle for existence to rule over our utopian dreams.  In A Modern Utopia it is 
recognised that evolution depends upon variability as well as struggle.  Thus, social evolution is a 
relentless process of change that requires continuous human activity, along with a range of 
human aptitude that is diverse enough to cope.  A Modern Utopia requires ‘all and more of the 
mental contrariety we find in the world of the real’ (Wells 1905: 87). 
But Wells seems unable to escape visions of a highly stratified society, ruled by a benevolent 
dictatorship of voluntary noblemen, the Samurai.  Self-denying and motivated towards the 
common good, this group of philosopher-kings must effect the containment of and bring 
together into unity of purpose, that necessary though fragmentary ‘mental contrariety’.   
From the Samurai to the lowest class there is a gradual movement of people; those who display 
poor qualities move downwards, and those who display promise ascend.  Those who find 
themselves at the bottom, struggling in the trials of life, would receive state assistance, and, for as 
long as they remain at such a level, they would be encouraged not to breed.  Self-selection of 
breeding partner would occur for all those above a minimum wage, though each party would be 
made aware of the calibre of their partner by a central record office before the deed is done, 
having the opportunity thus to withdraw.  Social surgery is to be reserved for only the most 
perverse and dangerous types who would be removed to distant islands and segregated by sex. 
With basic provision taken care of the struggle for existence ceases to operate at the subsistence 
level, taking place instead between individuals on a higher, more civilised plane.  Rough 
classifications divide people into groups in order to determine the broad lines of social 
organisation:  ‘Four main classes of mind are distinguished’ into which people ‘drift of their own 
accord’, these are the ‘Poietic, the Kinetic, the Dull and the Base.  The former two are supposed 
to constitute the living tissue of the State; the latter are the fulcra and resistances’ (Wells 1905: 
179).  The Dull and the Base have already been mentioned, being the types to gravitate towards 
prohibited breeding or export to distant islands. 
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Found at the other end, members of the Poietic class exhibit a diverse range of mental 
contrariety, unified only by virtue of their great creativity and imagination.  They are able to look 
beyond popular opinion and current practice - a fundamental resource for an ever-changing 
State.  Against this, the Kinetic class is a source of stability for the Kinetics have imaginations 
that do not range beyond the known.  These are what we would call ‘normal’ human beings on 
earth, whilst the Poietics are renowned for their slight ‘abnormality’.  Working vigorously within 
the boundaries of their imagination, the Kinetics tend to be ‘more moral and more trustworthy 
than the Poietic types’, but the combination of these two forms allows for a State that is ‘rapidly 
progressive and adaptable, and yet coherent, persistent, powerful and efficient’ (Wells 1905: 182).   
The Criminal Mind, so long as it does not commit criminal act, and become classified as Base, 
will become an asset to the Poietics as they tirelessly work to uncover the limits imposed upon 
society and experiment with the possibility of transcendence.  Returning to Foucault; theirs 
would be ‘a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the 
historical analysis of the limits imposed upon us and an experiment with the possibility of going 
beyond them’ (Foucault 2000: 319). 
But the relation between genealogist and Poietic can only extend so far, as the former would 
doubt the efficacy of such a highly regulated system of creative reform, one that is so very 
dependent on the benevolence and openness of its ruling Samurai.  Though more advanced than 
the sort of ‘piecemeal social engineering’ Popper (1972: 66) would advocate several decades later, 
this sort of controlled reform would be antithetical to genealogical work, and yet as I shall argue, 
reformism is the position that genealogy is at risk of falling into.  That is, a position of calm 
acceptance in the face of existing dispositions of power. 
By 1914 Wells was expressing doubts about regulated mental contrariety, as he had earlier come 
to doubt eugenics; claiming that there is ‘in the affairs of mankind something unorganised which 
is greater than any organisation’. Attempts at control bring with them the danger of paralysis.  
Indeed, the worst enemies this freedom can have ‘are a swarm of busy little bureaucrats 
professing to direct or protect it and working in its name.  Order is a convenience, but 
Anarchism is the aim and outcome of that convenience’ (Wells 1914b: 280-1).  
It should be recognised that Wells is still far from genealogy here; indeed he remains firmly 
within the modern tradition:  His views on education are based upon the dissemination of 
universal knowledge, with educational textbook works such as The Outline of History and The Science 
of Life intended to further this project.  In World Brain he imagines a network, facilitated by 
advances in microfilm that would provide an encyclopaedic digest of all knowledge to all who 
required it.  Wells hoped that such a collective, and authoritative index of knowledge would 
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promote mutual understanding and world peace (Wells 1938).  Drawing connections between 
Wells and genealogy is obviously problematic, and so all I wish to suggest is a general affinity.   
Wells exists within the limits of objective knowledge; Foucault looks for the limitations that 
objectifying knowledge creates.  Returning to A Modern Utopia we should remember that 
alongside its rigid hierarchical structure it also contains a sub-structure of scientific endeavour 
and refinement.  Though Wells later doubts the bureaucratic form of his utopia, the high status 
of science is left unchallenged.  When he invokes anarchism, it is opposed to the excessive 
regulation of human affairs but not to scientific knowledge.  However, if Wells had the 
nineteenth century philosopher Bakunin in mind when he mentioned anarchism, the limiting 
framework of science becomes less absolute, and the affinity between Wells and genealogy 
becomes a little less controversial.  For Bakunin ‘science is the compass of life; but it is not life.  
Science is unchangeable, impersonal, general, abstract… Life is wholly fugitive and temporary, 
but also wholly palpitating with reality…  Science creates nothing; it establishes and recognises 
only the creations of life… It follows that the only mission of science is to enlighten life, not to 
govern it’ (Bakunin 1916: 55).  Thus Bakunin affirms a place outside science, whilst also placing a 
limit upon scientific intervention.   
We have travelled far since the stark eugenic proposals of Anticipations.  Tamed subversions 
operating within the most regulated of social systems have been superseded within the Wellsian 
imagination.  If we are to fully accommodate ourselves to a world in flux, we must realise that no 
measure of planning will be able to cope.  We cannot foresee the problems that will arise and 
thus we cannot create mechanisms that will fully guard against their dangers.   Trapping Poietics 
within a system of control and attempting to tap their creativity will fail.  Constant flux and 
realignment demands we accept the essential role that anarchic thought has to play...   
How we can travel from eugenic thought - the supposed perversion of counterhistory - to a 
position that begins to resemble the genealogical project, is a problem that requires attention.  If 
evolutionary thinking can be found within genealogy, we might have an answer.   
Pearson and Biopower 
The order of Mind is one with the order of Matter; hence that Mind alone is free which 
finds itself in Nature, and Nature in itself (Pearson 1888). 
More than a decade before Anticipations was published there appeared a collection of essays by 
Karl Pearson entitled The Ethic of Freethought.  Within this collection we discover the sort of 
rational man prophesied by Wells, one who will ‘not be squeamish’ as he engages in the project 
of reconfiguring ethics and wider society upon a more rational basis (Wells 1901: 258).  As with 
Wells’ Anticipations we find within The Ethic of Freethought some of the crucial traits of biopower. 
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According to Pearson (1888: x) a ‘rational basis for morals’ is ‘the only safe guide to action’.  It is 
time to separate morality from rite and dispense with conceptions of ‘good and evil, as if they 
had an absolute or abstract value’.  For that which is immoral is ‘simply another term for what is 
anti-social’, and that which is antisocial can be decided on rational terms based upon a human 
science that takes the overall ‘welfare of society’ as its primary concern (Pearson 1888: 105).  
There ought to be no limits, no social conventions that can stand in the way of rational 
advancement.  For example, if this rational code can justify in the name of overall social welfare, 
the ‘interference of society (the state) in the heart of the family,-at least in the family of the anti-
social propagators of inefficient and unnecessary human beings’, then so be it (Pearson 1888: 
417).   
When morality is ‘a question not of feeling but of knowledge and study’ (Pearson 1888: 110), 
education becomes central to the organisation and stability of society.  The computation of what 
is social/anti-social according to the overall welfare of society is demanding, indeed, very few are 
‘capable of being really moral’.  This sort of person ‘must be in possession of the highest 
knowledge of his time, so he will be in possession of all that is known of the laws of human 
development.  He, and he only, is capable of fulfilling his social instinct in accordance with those 
laws.’  The ‘ignorant and the uneducated cannot be freethinkers’ and they ‘cannot be moral’ for 
morality ‘is not the blind following of a social impulse, but a habit of action…moulded by that 
knowledge of truth which must become an integral part of our being’ (Pearson 1888: 107).  
The ignorant are not wicked, they are just ignorant and in need of education.  The labouring 
classes fall into this category, and ‘incapable of moral action’ they are a significant threat to social 
stability.  Ignorant and driven by mere passion, the ‘blind feeling of the masses’ is open to 
manipulation by those who use tools other than reason.  And so ‘all real social reform can only 
proceed step by step with the slow, often hardly perceptible, process of popular education’ in the 
hope that revolutionary threat might be abated (Pearson 1888: 116).  Only education can endow 
people with the sense to act in ways that accord with the overall welfare of society (as defined by 
those few who are ‘capable of being really moral’).  Calculation of the conditions favourable to 
overall welfare is however ‘a problem requiring the careful and scientific investigation of the state 
itself - only by such investigation shall we be able to determine what is social or anti-social, what 
is healthy or unhealthy, in the proposals of both old and new Malthusians’ (Pearson 1888: 429). 
In this highly authoritarian scheme we can find echoes of Foucauldian biopower, in which not 
only ‘life’ but also the ‘nature of things’ becomes the object of concern.  A certain naturalness is 
now discovered in human affairs, and this naturalness becomes the principle for a new mode of 
power (and a new code of ethics).  As Pearson exemplifies, a moral effect is to be found in this 
switch.  Good judgement is no longer opposed by wickedness; instead it finds its opponent to be 
ignorance, ignorance of the ‘nature’ of things.  We must now respect and investigate natural 
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processes in order to nurture them, for if we fail to abide by what is natural there will be negative 
consequences.  ‘In other words, there will either be success or failure’.  Success or failure, ‘rather 
than legitimacy or illegitimacy, now become the criteria of governmental [and moral] action’ 
(Foucault 1979: 16).  The justification for action is now to be found within the nature of the 
objects of government. 
This is where we find Pearson who was providing back in 1888 some key extensions to the 
notion of biopower (that perversion of counterhistory).  A rational basis for morals, and the 
principle of social order was to be found in the pursuit of knowledge, in the scientific unmasking 
of the nature of humanity.   
For us the task remaining is to uncover whether Pearson advances aspects of Foucauldian 
genealogy alongside his moral scheme.  My claim is that the evolutionary metaphor that underlies 
both Pearson’s moral naturalism and the genealogical approach is what makes this double 
connection between Pearson and biopower and Pearson and genealogy possible.  I shall illustrate 
the connection between Pearson and genealogy below. 
Pearson and Genealogy 
Though evolution is best thought of as a cluster of interrelated concepts that have changed 
configuration throughout time, and even though the translation of the evolutionary metaphor 
into the social realm has been wide-ranging (see for example Bowler 2003, Hawkins 1998), there 
are some fairly basic characteristics that can be identified:  The notions of relentless mortal 
pressure and incessant struggle are reasonably core.  Adaptation tends to be the source of change 
(whether by the use and disuse of organs or by natural variability), and change tends to be 
gradual.  Evolutionary outcomes are the result of confrontation where the fitter survive and the 
weaker fail. 
Pearson connects these ideas to his preference for gradual reform.  His champion is the 
‘freethinker’ who exercises restraint, unlike those ‘socialists of the old school, who think that 
revolutionary agitation, paper schemes of social reconstruction, and manifestoes appealing to 
class passion, are the only possible means of action’ (Pearson 1988: 117).  What they fail to realise 
is that ‘human progress, like Nature, never leaps; this is the most certain of all laws deduced from 
the study of human development’ (Pearson 1888: 110).  ‘Human society cannot be changed in a 
year, scarcely in a hundred years; it is an organism as complex as that of the most differentiated 
type of physical life; you can ruin that organism as you can destroy life, but remould it you 
cannot without the patient labour of generations, even of centuries’ (Pearson 1888: 109).  For 
there ‘is a principle lying at the basis of all growth’ one that was ‘first made manifest by the 
naturalist, but will one day receive its most striking corroboration from the scientific historian’ 
(Pearson 1888: 411): ‘Social growth takes place by evolution not by revolution’ (Pearson 1888: 
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110).  If we are to work towards change, we must first reduce our expectations in face of the 
slow pace of evolutionary reality.  As we come to appreciate ‘the laws which have dictated the 
rise and decay of human societies’ we shall realise how gradual is the pace of change and we shall 
feel the heavy burden of historical inertia.   
A scientific appreciation of human history in evolutionary terms allows us to realise that 
confrontations only result in the gradual attrition of the human project into a smoother, more 
perfect form.  And so we come to hold a more limited set of hopes that are more in tune with 
human possibility.  Indeed we begin to realise that no ‘single man, no single group of men, no 
generation of men can remodel human society; their influence when measured in the future will 
be found wondrously insignificant’.  There may be “revolutions” but ‘when the historian…comes 
to investigate that phase of society’ he finds a ‘great deal of human pain, a great deal of 
destruction’, but of ‘human creation’ the ‘veriest little’.  New forms might have arisen through 
such “revolutions” but under them we find ‘the old slave turning the old wheel; humanity toiling 
on under the old yoke’, old forms enduring (Pearson 1888: 109).   
In revolutionary times it ‘is the duty of those who have the leisure to investigate, to show how by 
gradual and continuous changes we can restrain these [threatening] forces within safe channels, 
so that society shall emerge strong and efficient again’ (Pearson 1888: xi).  If nothing else, the 
freethinker will teach us all a little humility. 
As I shall argue, similarities begin to emerge here between Pearson’s outlook and Foucauldian 
genealogy.  It is therefore with a deliberate sense of irony that I now quote Foucault, drawing 
from a text in which he directly criticises the sort of ‘bourgeois’ reformist history that Pearson 
exemplifies above:   
[I]f history is indeed caught up in a time frame analogous to that of life forms, if the same 
evolutionary processes are at work in life and in history, then human societies have no 
particular specificity, and they have no other lawfulness, no other determination or 
regularity than life itself.  And just as there is no violent revolution in life, but simply a slow 
accumulation of tiny mutations, in the same way human history cannot really have the 
potential for a violent revolution; it can never harbor within itself anything more than 
imperceptible changes.  By metaphorizing history in the analogy of life, one thus 
guaranteed that human societies would be incapable of revolution (Foucault 1972: 431).   
In contrast, we are told that history should become ‘detached’ from this ‘ideological system’.  It 
should become involved in change through deliberate analytic work in a project that is free of the 
evolutionary metaphor.  Historical effort is to be concerned with a very specific sort of analysis, 
one that seeks to investigate ‘the transformations societies are actually capable of’ (Foucault 1972: 
423). 
Now Foucault is at odds with Pearson in many respects.  The appeal to science that is to be 
found in Pearson is clearly antithetical to someone who calls for ‘the insurrection of knowledges’, 
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an insurrection that sets itself against the ‘centralizing power-effects that are bound up with the 
institutionalization and workings of any scientific discourse’.  Genealogy is an ‘antiscience’  
(Foucault 1976a: 9).  Indeed, it will always resist such disciplinary regularisation, for to be 
effective, it must retain its ability to shift position in a tactical game.  It must retain room for 
manoeuvre, in order to respond with appropriate flexibility to any regime of power and 
knowledge that comes into focus.  Genealogy adopts a fragmentary gnawing action. 
But in other respects I sometimes find myself hearing Pearson in Foucault, or Foucault in 
Pearson.  On socialist revolution, Foucault takes a similar line:  We are told that it ‘inevitably 
reaffected or reinvested the very power-mechanisms constituted by the capitalist State or the 
industrial State’ (Foucault 1976a: 260).  For Pearson, revolutions fail to instil fundamental change 
because human evolution is a process of gradual attrition.  And so we always find ‘the old slave 
turning the old wheel’ once revolution has passed (Pearson 1888: 109).  According to Foucault, 
revolutions fail when systems of power are not adequately perceived, allowing them to continue 
after a process of transformation that failed to achieve sufficient depth.  Thus Foucault accepts 
the theoretical possibility of revolution, whilst Pearson rules it out on evolutionary terms.  
Nevertheless, those familiar with the intricacies of Foucauldian power analysis must sometimes 
wonder if it would ever be possible to conduct a revolution at the necessary level of detail.  And 
so, in effect we find ourselves in a similar position, believing in gradualism and the impossibility 
of rupture. 
The genealogical concept of ‘emergence’ also sounds familiar when reading Pearson once we 
recognise the extent to which Pearson’s writing is infused with evolutionism, where outcomes are 
the result of confrontation and change is gradual.  According to ‘emergence’ historical events are 
the result of ‘a particular state of forces’, they occur where forces intersect, at their frontier.  And 
as a result of such irreducible complexity, no one agent can be held ‘responsible for an 
emergence; no one can glory in it, since it always occurs in the interstice’ (Foucault 1971: 376-7).  
No ‘single man, no single group of men, no generation of men can remodel human society; their 
influence when measured in the future will be found wondrously insignificant’ (Pearson 1888: 
109).   
Power is everywhere, it comes from everywhere, and these multiple, interacting forces have been 
the formative stuff of history.  Indeed, the study of history reveals such interminable complexity.  
And so we come to believe that it is the duty of those who have the leisure to investigate, to 
reveal these forces so that we may act with greater caution in the present.  Pearson would look 
for laws of human progress, Foucault would look for tactical pointers, but either way, our hopes 
face a terrible reduction in the face of ‘reality’.  This is both the lesson of evolution, and the 
apparent lesson of dispersed power, when a worldview is based on scattered confrontation and a 
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process of change that is dependent upon the interactions of all.  It is at this point that Foucault and 
Pearson meet, for this is the source of the above claimed futility of change. 
According to the Foucauldians Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, we shall never ‘enter the utopias 
or dystopias of futurology’.  Rather, in order to ‘understand and intervene in possible futures we 
need an analytic which is more modest and empirical, attuned to all the small mutations where 
today is becoming different from yesterday’ (Rabinow and Rose 2006: 205).  We must become 
piecemeal in our criticisms.  And if only, in some small way, we manage to ‘increase the 
“thinkability” of the relations of force that shape our present’ we have served our purpose (Barry, 
Osborne & Rose 1996: 2).  We are to leave being ‘for’ or ‘against’ the present to others: 
[T]he imperative discourse that consists in saying “strike against this and do so in this way,” 
seems to me to be very flimsy when delivered from a teaching institution or even just on a 
piece of paper.  In any case, it seems to me that the dimension of what is to be done can 
only appear within a field of real forces, that is to say within a field of forces that cannot be 
created by a speaking subject alone and on the basis of his words, because it is a field of 
forces that cannot in any way be controlled or asserted within this kind of imperative 
discourse.  So, since there has to be an imperative, I would like the one underpinning the 
theoretical analysis we are attempting to be quite simply a conditional imperative of the 
kind:  If you want to struggle, here are some key points, here are some lines of force, here 
are some constrictions and blockages.  In other words, I would like these imperatives to be 
no more than tactical pointers.  Of course, it’s up to me, and those who are working in the 
same direction, to know on what fields of real forces we need to get our bearings in order 
to make a tactically effective analysis (Foucault 1978: 3). 
Is Genealogy to be Kinetic or Poietic? 
It can be no bad thing to question the imperative discourses of a teaching institution.  Certainly, 
genealogy is not about delivering commands or issuing instructions, and as a genealogist Foucault 
would rightfully rebel against such discourse.  Addressing itself to relations of force genealogy 
has a far more subversive and destructive intent.   
But should we be satisfied if we make things a little more thinkable?  Or should we, in the light 
of potential correlations between Foucault’s genealogy and Pearson’s reformism, suspect that 
improving the thinkability of relations of force is a strangely pacified idea, pacified by what it 
perceives to be the surrounding reality of power.  By acknowledging ‘emergence’ and the 
dispersion of power - where change becomes dependent upon the interactions of all - do we not 
reduce in size and increase in humility to become rather small in our desires?  Is the follower of 
Nietzsche not gradually tamed by the genealogical worldview?   
According to my account, this twist in the genealogical project does seem to be at the very least a 
plausible scenario.  So my claim is this:  Though it begins with Poietic intentions, genealogy 
becomes Kinetic if it is reduced to mere empirical revelations of power.  It becomes less radical 
than it might otherwise have been when it derives the futility of change from the dispersion of 
power.  In terms of educational research, genealogy is faced with a similar scenario; it can either 
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temper its criticisms of power in education to what is deemed realistic, favouring gradual internal 
reform and amelioration; or it can connect its criticisms of education to a level of imagination 
that allows itself to believe in the possibility of broader social change and the more fundamental 
adjustments in education that this might allow.   
The Foucauldian approach to power risks convincing us that reformism is the sensible option.  
In the terminology of A Modern Utopia - it appeals to our Kinetic disposition.  To remain Poietic 
is to refuse such reasonable and pragmatic conclusions.  The Poietic Foucauldian recalls that 
genealogy ‘is not given to discrete effacement before the objects it observes’ (Foucault 1971: 
382).  And this requires traits of the criminal/transgressive mind; that is, a degree of boldness 
and energy that exceeds the apparent needs of our social environment.  It requires a large amount 
of imagination, and a belief in something ‘unorganised which is greater than any organisation’ 
(Wells 1914b: 280).  To be Poietic is to retain the ability to dream.  Genealogy is certainly ‘gray, 
meticulous, and patiently documentary’ (Foucault 1971: 368) but it also ‘disturbs what was 
previously considered immobile’ where nothing is considered sacred (Foucault 1971: 375).  Of 
course, genealogy is not sacred either, and if evolutionism is to be found in its depths then we 
must ask of it a question:  What then is the mode of genealogy to be?  Will it be Kinetic or 
Poietic? 
 
Notes: 
1. Wherever possible, references refer to date of first publication.  The publication date of the consulted text appears 
in the references in square brackets. 
2. I am greatly indebted to recent article by Roy Goddard (forthcoming) who arrives at conclusions of a similar 
nature though from a very different angle. 
3. For more detail on this point see Foucault (1976a: 208). 
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